Introduction
Technology development, new knowledge discovery, natural disasters, economic changes, scientific advancement and climate change often lead to outcomes that are unforeseeable. In reality, many events in the considerably far future are intrinsically unknown. Therefore, one cannot even obtain the probability distributions of these events. This paper develops a new class of cooperative stochastic differential games with intrinsic unknowns in the state dynamics and the players' future payoff structures. Information about the future will be revealed stage by stage. Adapting to the new information the players revise their strategies accordingly. In dynamic cooperative games, a stringent condition on cooperation and agreement is required: In the solution, the optimality principle must remain optimal throughout the game, at any instant of time along the optimal state trajectory determined at the outset. This condition is known as subgame consistency (see Yeung and Petrosyan [1] [2] ). This is the first time that stochastic differential games are expanded to accommodate intrinsic unknowns. It extends the Petrosyan [3] analysis to a framework with stochastic state dynamics with more general payoff structures. The present analysis also covers the Petrosyan and Yeung [4] game in the case where precise information on the probabilities of the unknown future events can be obtained. Of course, allowing the existence of intrinsic unknowns represents an expanded paradigm of the Petrosyan and Yeung [4] work with more realistic characteristics. Finally, the paper develops two novel mathematical theorems. First, a special class of stochastic dynamic programming technique is developed to obtain the expected joint payoff under cooperation with intrinsic unknowns. Second, a novel theorem for the derivation of a Payoff Distribution (PDP) for a subgame consistent solution for this class of games is presented. . Given that precise information are known for two time intervals, the game becomes a compressed game with 2 time intervals. Consider the case where the players agree to cooperate and maximized their expected joint payoff. In particular, the compressed cooperative game in the time interval
Game Formulation and Joint Payoff Maximization
can be expressed as maximizing the joint expected payoff ( 2 2 ) (
subject to state dynamics
is the best guess of the expected joint payoff covering the
A schematic diagram depicting the information flow and the formation of compressed games in the time interval Figure 1 below. 
Subgame Consistent Payoff Distribution
To ensure that cooperation can be sustainable we have to seek a subgame consistent solution for cooperative stochastic differential games with intrinsic unknowns. At time ( 2 2 ) ( 
yields imputation vector The instantaneous payment in (7) satisfies the condition of subgame consistency in the time interval
proved in Yeung and Petrosyan [1] . Hence Theorem 2 yields a PDP that leads to a subgame consistent solution of the cooperative stochastic differential game with intrinsic unknowns (1)- (2) .
Note that the payoff distribution procedure in (6)- (7) 
Conclusion
This paper develops a new class of stochastic differential games with intrinsic unknowns in the state dynamics and the players' future payoff structures. New techniques involving information adaptation is derived for solving the optimal solution of cooperative stochastic differential games. A novel theorem for the derivation of a Payoff Distribution Procedure (PDP) leading to a subgame consistent solution for this class of games is also presented. The game represents an extension of Petrosyan [3] analysis with stochastic dynamics and more general payoff structures. The present analysis provides an expanded framework to the Petrosyan and Yeung [4] game with the more realistic element of intrinsic unknowns. Further research on differential games with the realistic elements of intrinsic unknown future events is expected.
